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Lobbying and Bribes 






We use survey responses by firms to examine the firm-level determinants and effects of 
political influence, their perception of corruption and prevalence of bribe paying. We find 
that: (a) measures of political influence and corruption/bribes are uncorrelated at the firm 
level; (b) firms that are larger, older, exporting, government-owned, are widely held and/or 
have fewer competitors have more political influence, perceive corruption to be less of a 
problem and pay bribes less often; (c) influence increases sales and government subsidies and 
in general makes the firm have a more positive view on the government. In sum, we show 
that “strong” firms use their influence to bend laws and regulations, whereas “weak” firms 
pay bribes to mitigate the costs of government intervention. 







Boulevard de Constance 
France – 77305 Fontainebleau Cedex 
morten.bennedsen@insead.edu 
Sven E. Feldmann 
Melbourne Business School 
200 Leicester Street 
Australia – Carlton VIC 3053 
S.Feldmann@mbs.edu 
 
David Dreyer Lassen 
Department of Economics 
University of Copenhagen 





We thank Jim Alt, Michael Laver, Tom Palfrey, Christian Schultz, Alastair Smith and 
seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School, INSEAD, the Midwest Political Science 
Association Meetings, Australasian Public Choice Meetings, New York University and the 
University of Copenhagen for comments and suggestions. Funding from EPRN, the Danish 
Social Science Foundation and Economic Policy in the Modern Welfare State (WEST) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 	 ﾠ 2	 ﾠ
1.  Introduction	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
An	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠrunning	 ﾠa	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Whether	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠcomplies	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠexemptions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠit,	 ﾠor	 ﾠattempts	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthem	 ﾠhas	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
firm’s	 ﾠprofitability,	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠ(Baron,	 ﾠ1999).	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠ analyze	 ﾠ empirically	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ above	 ﾠ strategies	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ chooses	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ
interaction	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
prevalence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ both	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ lobbying	 ﾠ activity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ firms.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ While	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ
literature	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ examined	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ features	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ
corruption,	 ﾠfew	 ﾠstudies	 ﾠhave	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐determinants	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠ
side	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ influence;	 ﾠ though	 ﾠ see	 ﾠ Svensson	 ﾠ (2003)	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ empirical	 ﾠ
characterization	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ bribes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Uganda.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ
investigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmake	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠlobby	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Whether	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ engage	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ lobbying	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ both)	 ﾠ depends	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
combination	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemand-ﾭ‐side	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupply-ﾭ‐side	 ﾠfactors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠside—i.e.,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
willingness	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠofficials’	 ﾠto	 ﾠbend	 ﾠrules	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresponsiveness	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ lobbying	 ﾠ efforts—is	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ determined	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ
features	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegal,	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠenvironment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠside,	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠ firm-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ industry-ﾭ‐characteristics	 ﾠ largely	 ﾠ determine	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ valuable	 ﾠ
exceptions	 ﾠto	 ﾠor	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠcontracts	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠbureaucrat	 ﾠsteer	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
contract	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ way	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ sells	 ﾠ primarily	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ sector.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Similarly,	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠeager	 ﾠor	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠor	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
prevent	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠintervention	 ﾠthan	 ﾠare	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠor	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
sector	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfaces	 ﾠimport	 ﾠcompetition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ claim	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ show	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ lobbying	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
largely	 ﾠ substitutes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ rule-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ responsive	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ business	 ﾠ
interests	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrupt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠare	 ﾠadverse	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
business	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠameliorate	 ﾠthem,	 ﾠor	 ﾠif	 ﾠofficeholders	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠbend	 ﾠthose	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠof	 ﾠaction	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
firm	 ﾠcould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠseek	 ﾠways	 ﾠaround	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠby	 ﾠengaging	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠWe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐determinants	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhich	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ
characteristics	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ associated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ
lobbying?	 ﾠ	 ﾠHow	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠinteract:	 ﾠare	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠalso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠones	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpowerful	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ influence,	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ lobbying	 ﾠ indeed,	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ claimed	 ﾠ above,	 ﾠ reduce	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ firm’s	 ﾠ
likelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠcorrupt?	 ﾠ	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠare	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsuccessful	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠprofitability,	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
improve	 ﾠthose	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠor	 ﾠare	 ﾠthese	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠunrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠsuccess?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠuse	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank	 ﾠGroup’s	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBusiness	 ﾠEnvironment	 ﾠ
Survey	 ﾠ (WBES)	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ identify	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ sources	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ variation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ perceived	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐assessed	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠnational	 ﾠdecision-ﾭ‐makers.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firm-ﾭ‐	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ industry-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠ sources	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ variation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
perceived	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ instrumental	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ approach	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ identify	 ﾠ
causal	 ﾠrelationships.	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠresults	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing:	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠlarger,	 ﾠolder,	 ﾠand	 ﾠexport	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
perceive	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠon	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠ
time,	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcompetitive	 ﾠenvironment	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠ environment	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ corrupt.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Almost	 ﾠ all	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ determinants	 ﾠ affect	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ opposite	 ﾠ directions.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Second,	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ instruments	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠface	 ﾠless	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreverse,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtrue;	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠdecrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠperceived	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Third,	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠsales	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠweakly	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠ activity).	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ An	 ﾠ independent	 ﾠ variation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ (corruption)	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ(lower)	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠsales.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ summary,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ empirical	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ lobbying	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribes	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
substitutes	 ﾠand,	 ﾠfurthermore,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlobbying—or	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
—is	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠas	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠlacking	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
access.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠcall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠstrong.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWeaker	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
exploitation	 ﾠby	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠbureaucrats.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠweak	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
choose	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠor	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠbureaucrats	 ﾠerect	 ﾠhurdles	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠextract	 ﾠ
rents,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠoption	 ﾠweakens	 ﾠthese	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠbargaining	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠand	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠloss	 ﾠon	 ﾠthem	 ﾠthan	 ﾠon	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlegitimate	 ﾠroutes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
access.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠanti-ﾭ‐corruption	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
succeed,	 ﾠ policy	 ﾠ makers	 ﾠ should	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ into	 ﾠ consideration	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ inherent	 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐off	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ demand	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ (i.e.,	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠ engaging	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ corruption).	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ If	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ means	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ participate	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠless	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠbreak	 ﾠthem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠlends	 ﾠ
empirical	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ hypothesis	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ order	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ improve	 ﾠ governance,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
particularly	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ developing	 ﾠ countries,	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ balanced	 ﾠ representation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
stakeholders	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠneeds	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠavailable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ believe	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ four	 ﾠ key	 ﾠ differences	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ exercise	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠdefinition,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠillegal	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not.1	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Second,	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ attempt	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
circumvent	 ﾠor	 ﾠviolate	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠrules	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠcase-ﾭ‐by-ﾭ‐case	 ﾠbasis,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠwielding	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠattempting	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠ	 ﾠE.g.,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
may	 ﾠ take	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ form	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ bribes	 ﾠ required	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ obtain	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ business	 ﾠ license	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ win	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠcontract.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThird,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠhorizon	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ investor	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ (or	 ﾠ bureaucratic)	 ﾠrelationship.2	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Changing	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠa	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠlasting	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcostly	 ﾠthan	 ﾠseeking	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐
off	 ﾠexemption	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule.	 ﾠFourth,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠaccrues	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠor	 ﾠindividual,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠlobbying	 ﾠor	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠa	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠor	 ﾠentire	 ﾠindustries,	 ﾠor	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠindustry-ﾭ‐wide	 ﾠsubsidies	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
tax	 ﾠexemptions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
These	 ﾠ distinctions	 ﾠ give	 ﾠ rise	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ relevant	 ﾠ trade-ﾭ‐offs	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ choosing	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠrequires	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
up-ﾭ‐front	 ﾠinvestment,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠall	 ﾠelse	 ﾠequal,	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠfragmented	 ﾠ
industry	 ﾠmay	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdominate	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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1	 ﾠKaufmann	 ﾠand	 ﾠVicente	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠmore	 ﾠidiosyncratically,	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠillegal	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠdenote	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠparties	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠlegislation	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
campaign	 ﾠcontributions.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠadopt	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠterminology.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ(expert)	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠare	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠcorrelated.	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠby	 ﾠHarstad	 ﾠand	 ﾠSvensson	 ﾠ(2009).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmodel,	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠeither	 ﾠ
bribe	 ﾠbureaucrats	 ﾠto	 ﾠbend	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules	 ﾠor	 ﾠlobby	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠThey	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rules	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠirreversible	 ﾠdecision,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠsetting,	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
observe	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠlobbying,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhorizon	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchange	 ﾠof	 ﾠrules.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠframework,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlegislature	 ﾠis	 ﾠweak	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠchance	 ﾠof	 ﾠrulings	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠoverturned,	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠless	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠlobbying	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠwhich,	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn,	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠamount	 ﾠof	 ﾠlobbying	 ﾠand	 ﾠdecreases	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relative	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠbribes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
industry	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠmore	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐connected	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ relatively	 ﾠ cheaper	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ change	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ rules	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ those	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠaccess,	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠresult	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠcorrupt.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtrusts	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
legislative	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠperceives	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠreturn	 ﾠon	 ﾠinvesting	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdeems	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠunreliable	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbelieves	 ﾠnew	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
adopted,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠenforced	 ﾠor	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlast.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠempirical,	 ﾠowing	 ﾠin	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠpart	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠand	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠof	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐national	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠindices	 ﾠmeasuring	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ(surveyed	 ﾠin	 ﾠTreisman,	 ﾠ2007),	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
special	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ politics	 ﾠ (e.g.	 ﾠ Grossman	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Helpman,	 ﾠ 2003)	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ been	 ﾠ mostly	 ﾠ
theoretical,	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠwork	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠconcentrated	 ﾠon	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
cases,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠcomparative,	 ﾠquantitative	 ﾠwork	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcauses	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
influence.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ paper	 ﾠ connects	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ research	 ﾠ areas	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ providing	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
comparative	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠperspective,	 ﾠconnecting	 ﾠlobbying	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ literature	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ lobbying	 ﾠ investigates,	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ theoretically,	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ interest	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠ communicate	 ﾠ information	 ﾠ important	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ decision-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
politicians.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Bennedsen	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Feldmann	 ﾠ (2002)	 ﾠ examine	 ﾠ theoretically	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
endogenous	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠproviding	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelate	 ﾠ
this	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstitutional	 ﾠsetting,	 ﾠand	 ﾠHall	 ﾠand	 ﾠDeardorff	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
transfers	 ﾠof	 ﾠfacts	 ﾠand	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠas	 ﾠ(yet	 ﾠanother)	 ﾠway	 ﾠof	 ﾠtransferring	 ﾠ
resources	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoliticians.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Firms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠhave	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠformal	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ rule-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ process,	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ privileged	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ decision-ﾭ‐makers	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
relying	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ connections.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Fisman	 ﾠ (2000)	 ﾠ examined	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ ties	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
President	 ﾠ Suharto	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ Indonesia	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ explored	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effects	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ news	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 7	 ﾠ
Suharto’s	 ﾠhealth	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstock	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠperformance	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFaccio	 ﾠ
(2006)	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠ politicians	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ construct	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠ connections,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Faccio	 ﾠ et	 ﾠ al.	 ﾠ (2006)	 ﾠshow	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ connections	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
effective	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ securing	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ bailouts,	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ obtained	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
Khwaja	 ﾠand	 ﾠMian	 ﾠ(2005)	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPakistan	 ﾠbanking	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Dal	 ﾠBo	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2006)	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ(endogenous)	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠpoliticians	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcivil	 ﾠservants	 ﾠby	 ﾠmoney	 ﾠor	 ﾠthreats.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠby	 ﾠChamon	 ﾠand	 ﾠKaplan	 ﾠ
(2007)	 ﾠ examines	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ setting	 ﾠ where	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ can	 ﾠ threaten	 ﾠ politicians	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ
withholding	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposition.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠrest	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠorganized	 ﾠas	 ﾠfollows:	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection	 ﾠdescribes	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠand	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption/bribes	 ﾠare	 ﾠuncorrelated	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
firm	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSection	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults	 ﾠand	 ﾠsection	 ﾠ4	 ﾠconcludes.	 ﾠ
2.  Data	 ﾠ
2.1  Measuring	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ source	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ data,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ World	 ﾠ Bank	 ﾠ Groups’s	 ﾠ World	 ﾠ Business	 ﾠ
Environment	 ﾠ Survey	 ﾠ (WBES).	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ WBES	 ﾠ was	 ﾠ implemented	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ uniform	 ﾠ
methodology	 ﾠin	 ﾠ80	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠsurveying	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠ100	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
carried	 ﾠout	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlate	 ﾠ1998	 ﾠand	 ﾠcompleted	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠBatra	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSome	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠor	 ﾠsections	 ﾠwere	 ﾠnot	 ﾠasked	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠor	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠpurpose,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ58	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠwere	 ﾠregistered	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠmain	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest.3	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmost	 ﾠregressions,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreport	 ﾠresults	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ4,000	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5,000	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ57	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠThe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠin	 ﾠRussia	 ﾠis	 ﾠvery	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠresults	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
depend	 ﾠon	 ﾠRussia	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample.	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The	 ﾠ dependent	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ measuring	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ simple	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠfour	 ﾠquestions:	 ﾠ“How	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠyour	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠhave	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
X”	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠX	 ﾠis	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠexecutive,	 ﾠlegislature,	 ﾠministry,	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠrange	 ﾠgoes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(never	 ﾠinfluential)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ(very	 ﾠinfluential).4	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
question	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠask	 ﾠif	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠpursue	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠmode	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠ
elicits	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoverall	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcombination	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠstrategies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ answers	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ four	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ correlated	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ
level:	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠrange	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ.735	 ﾠto	 ﾠ.833,	 ﾠall	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠsignificant,	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
factor	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠloading	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfactor,	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ85	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠchoose,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠone	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Since	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdid	 ﾠnot	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠall	 ﾠfour	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠscore.5	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
questions	 ﾠare	 ﾠall	 ﾠvery	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠan	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠpattern:	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleast	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠthree	 ﾠmeasures,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlegislature	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠcorrelation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ end	 ﾠ result,	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ average	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ variable,	 ﾠ denoted	 ﾠ simply	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠbelow,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠskewed	 ﾠdistribution,	 ﾠas	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠ
panel	 ﾠa)	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠroughly	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠreport	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠin	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfour	 ﾠdimensions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFifteen	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠreport	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠinfluential,	 ﾠfrequently	 ﾠ
influential	 ﾠor	 ﾠvery	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage,	 ﾠand	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠreport	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠvery	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠin	 ﾠall	 ﾠfour	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠvenues.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠinteresting	 ﾠto	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠin	 ﾠSouth-ﾭ‐East	 ﾠAsia	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfluential,	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage.	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexact	 ﾠwording	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠAppendix.	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠAn	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠresponse	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠto	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfour	 ﾠ
questions,	 ﾠas	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmight	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠresources	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhighest	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Using	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmaximum-ﾭ‐measure	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠfactor	 ﾠscore	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠour	 ﾠresults.	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We	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ(Q:	 ﾠHow	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠis	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoperation	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠ
business?).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhow	 ﾠoften	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ
observes	 ﾠor	 ﾠexperiences	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
conducting	 ﾠbusiness.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcorrupt	 ﾠbehavior	 ﾠ
without	 ﾠconsidering	 ﾠit	 ﾠan	 ﾠobstacle	 ﾠto	 ﾠbusiness,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠentire	 ﾠcountry,	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠadapted	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ best	 ﾠ comparable	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ existing	 ﾠ cross-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
corruption,	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ	 ﾠApproximately	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurveyed	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
report	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠis	 ﾠnever	 ﾠor	 ﾠseldom	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ26	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠreport	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
mostly	 ﾠor	 ﾠalways	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ assesses	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ prevalence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ bribes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Respondents	 ﾠwere	 ﾠasked	 ﾠhow	 ﾠoften	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠirregular	 ﾠ“additional	 ﾠpayments”	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠthings	 ﾠdone.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠasked	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠpay	 ﾠbribes,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠrather	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠcustomary	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠthus	 ﾠavoids	 ﾠ
asking	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠillegal	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
elicit	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtruthful	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠsome	 ﾠambiguity	 ﾠas	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠmake	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpayments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠseems	 ﾠplausible,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠto	 ﾠpresume	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠrespondent	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠare	 ﾠfrequently/mostly/always	 ﾠ
paid	 ﾠin	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠbusiness,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠwe	 ﾠprimarily	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsecond,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdirect,	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠon	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠ
payments	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmeasure.6	 ﾠ	 ﾠHalf	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠnever	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
6	 ﾠResults	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠare	 ﾠvery	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠones	 ﾠreported	 ﾠand	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
available	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠauthors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 10	 ﾠ
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Transi on	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠ La n	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 ﾠ OECD	 ﾠ S/E	 ﾠAsia	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
bribes,	 ﾠ16	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠor	 ﾠalways	 ﾠpay	 ﾠbribes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAs	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠseen	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpanels	 ﾠb)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
c)	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistributions	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠskewed	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1a	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠour	 ﾠthree	 ﾠkey	 ﾠ
variables,	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpayment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠGeneral	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
perceptions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠof	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠ
correlated	 ﾠ(.36)	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠboth	 ﾠuncorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠ
very	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠzero.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Can	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbuild	 ﾠan	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠinvestigation	 ﾠaround	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠin	 ﾠsubjective	 ﾠsurveys?	 ﾠWe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠsource	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠand	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠsupplement	 ﾠto	 ﾠcross	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
based	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ expert	 ﾠ assessments.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ While	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ some	 ﾠ disagreement	 ﾠ about	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 12	 ﾠ
usefulness	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ validity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ popular	 ﾠ cross	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠTreisman,	 ﾠ2007),	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠstep	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠcheck	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompare	 ﾠ
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Numbers	 ﾠare:	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠcoefficient,	 ﾠp-ﾭ‐value,	 ﾠno.	 ﾠof	 ﾠobservations,	 ﾠ
respectively.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ        "Political	 ﾠInfluence"	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠfirms'	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ"What	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠon	 ﾠX?"	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠX	 ﾠis	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠexecutive,	 ﾠlegislature,	 ﾠministry,	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠagency,	 ﾠ
respectively.	 ﾠAnswers	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠscale	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2(never	 ﾠinfluential)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ6(very	 ﾠinfluential).	 ﾠ"Corruption"	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
country	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠfirms'	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ"How	 ﾠproblematic	 ﾠis	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
operation	 ﾠand	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠof	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbusiness?"	 ﾠAnswers	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠscale	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1(No	 ﾠobstacle)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ4(Major	 ﾠobstacle).	 ﾠ
"Bribe	 ﾠpaying"	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠfirms'	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ"Would	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
following	 ﾠsentence:	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠmy	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠsome	 ﾠirregular	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠdone	 ﾠis	 ﾠnever/seldom/.../always	 ﾠtrue?"	 ﾠAnswers	 ﾠwere	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠscale	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ1(never)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ6(always).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ "CPI"	 ﾠis	 ﾠTransparency	 ﾠInternational's	 ﾠCorruption	 ﾠPerceptions	 ﾠIndex.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ"Governance:	 ﾠcorruption"	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank's	 ﾠGovernance	 ﾠInstitute.	 ﾠ"Quality	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment"	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠInternational	 ﾠCountry	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠGuide	 ﾠ.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
scaled	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindex	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠAll	 ﾠdata	 ﾠrefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠ1999-ﾭ‐2000	 ﾠ
except	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠin	 ﾠtext.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
measures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐
country	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠused	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠliterature,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfeel	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconfident	 ﾠin	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconstructing	 ﾠour	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmeasure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ1b	 ﾠcorrelates	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
widely	 ﾠ used	 ﾠ Corruption	 ﾠ Perceptions	 ﾠ Index	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ Transparency	 ﾠ International,	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ
International	 ﾠ Country	 ﾠ Risk	 ﾠ Guide	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Quality	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ Government	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
Governance	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠon	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠBank	 ﾠ(Kaufmann	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.);	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
three	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠare	 ﾠcoded	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠmean	 ﾠless	 ﾠcorruption.7	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ level.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ continues	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
uncorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaggregated	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠand,	 ﾠ
while	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficients	 ﾠare	 ﾠinsignificant,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
three	 ﾠcountry-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠmeasures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ correlates	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ .84	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Transparency	 ﾠ International	 ﾠ
Corruption	 ﾠPerceptions	 ﾠIndex	 ﾠ(TICPI),	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠcorrelates	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTICPI	 ﾠat	 ﾠ.78.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠsuggests	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠthings:	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠin	 ﾠaccordance	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpert	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ(assuming	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠresponses	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠthese).	 ﾠ	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠtaps	 ﾠinto	 ﾠ
another,	 ﾠ previously	 ﾠ uninvestigated,	 ﾠ factor	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ governance.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ note	 ﾠ (not	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
7	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTI	 ﾠCPI	 ﾠis	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2000	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ12	 ﾠcountries;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTI	 ﾠCPI	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠ2001	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
2002.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠpotentially	 ﾠproblematic,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTI	 ﾠCPI	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ2001-ﾭ‐02	 ﾠactually	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWBES.	 ﾠLeaving	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠin	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ1b;	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠslightly	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠaverages	 ﾠof	 ﾠreported	 ﾠ
bribes	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTI	 ﾠCPI.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
shown)	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ raw	 ﾠ correlations	 ﾠ suggest	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
frequency	 ﾠof	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠpayments	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠlower	 ﾠin	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
quality	 ﾠof	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠperceived	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirms),	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠregarding	 ﾠ
influence:	 ﾠAverage	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠparliament	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
return	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbelow.	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠsurveys	 ﾠis	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠbias,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠless	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠmay	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠin	 ﾠways	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠthem	 ﾠseem	 ﾠlike	 ﾠoutliers,	 ﾠpossibly	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcorrespond	 ﾠto	 ﾠWestern	 ﾠ
conceptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ under	 ﾠ study,	 ﾠ possibly	 ﾠout	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ fear	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ repercussions	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregime.	 ﾠKenyon	 ﾠand	 ﾠNaoi	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠbody	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
different	 ﾠ purpose,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ examine	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ issue	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ detail.	 ﾠ They	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ no	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
systematic	 ﾠ“suppression”	 ﾠbias.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠa	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠvalidation	 ﾠcheck	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexamine	 ﾠhow	 ﾠour	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
measure	 ﾠ relates	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ Faccio’s	 ﾠ (2006)	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ connections.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Faccio	 ﾠ
investigates	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ connected	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ MP	 ﾠor	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ minister	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ
databases	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ questionnaires.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Unfortunately,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ groups	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ countries	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ
overlap	 ﾠvery	 ﾠmuch:	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ24	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠdata	 ﾠsets.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
correlation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠFaccio’s	 ﾠkey	 ﾠmeasure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠconnected,	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
high,	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠ(.46)	 ﾠwith	 ﾠour	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmeasure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ individual	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ level,	 ﾠ bias	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ arise	 ﾠ if	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ certain	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
characteristics	 ﾠ answer	 ﾠ questions	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribes	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ ways	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
systematically	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠother	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠholding	 ﾠconstant	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“true”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“objective”	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠor	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠattempt	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
extensive	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ control	 ﾠ variables;	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ variables,	 ﾠ including	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ
dummies,	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠand	 ﾠreporting	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠamong	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
2.2  Specification	 ﾠand	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠby	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrelates	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠusing	 ﾠ
OLS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠindicators	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠfirm-ﾭ‐invariant	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
impact	 ﾠon	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsupply-ﾭ‐side	 ﾠdifferences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ discussed	 ﾠ above,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ allows	 ﾠ us	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ focus	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ variation	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ market	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
corporate	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructures	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠside	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠskewed,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠexperimented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
various	 ﾠtransformations	 ﾠand	 ﾠordered	 ﾠprobit	 ﾠestimates,	 ﾠnone	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhad	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠfacilitate	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠand	 ﾠcomparisons,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstick	 ﾠto	 ﾠordinary	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠ squares,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ unchanged	 ﾠ using	 ﾠ models	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ ordered	 ﾠ categorical	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ non-ﾭ‐averaged	 ﾠ measure	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ influence.	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ well	 ﾠ known,	 ﾠ standard	 ﾠ
errors	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubstantially	 ﾠunderestimated,	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcluster	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠvariables,	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠintra-ﾭ‐cluster	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlower	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠobservational	 ﾠ
units.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠfor	 ﾠclustering	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠthroughout.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Market	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommercial	 ﾠopportunities	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthereby	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠand	 ﾠabilities	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regulation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠcharacteristics	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠ include	 ﾠ sector	 ﾠ (manufacturing,	 ﾠ service,	 ﾠ other,	 ﾠ agriculture,	 ﾠ construction),	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ competitors,	 ﾠ size	 ﾠ (small	 ﾠ (<	 ﾠ 50	 ﾠ empl),	 ﾠ medium	 ﾠ (50–500	 ﾠ empl),	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ
(>500	 ﾠ empl)),	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ exporter	 ﾠ (yes/no),	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ year	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
establishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠof	 ﾠowners	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠreasons.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠ affect	 ﾠ regulation	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ corporate	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ accounting	 ﾠ laws	 ﾠ directly.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ around	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ world,	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ accounting	 ﾠ requirements	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
publicly	 ﾠ traded	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ than	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ closely	 ﾠ held	 ﾠ firms.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Foreign	 ﾠ owned	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
regulated	 ﾠ differently	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ domestically	 ﾠ owned	 ﾠ ones	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ many	 ﾠ countries.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ More	 ﾠ
generally,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ ownership	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ identity	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ owners	 ﾠ affect	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
owners’	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠinteract	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregulative	 ﾠauthorities;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐connected	 ﾠ
owners	 ﾠmay	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠbribes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ
specific	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠstructure,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠand	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
owners	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ given	 ﾠ firm.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ particular,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ interested	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠ owned,	 ﾠ privately	 ﾠ domestically	 ﾠ owned	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ owned,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ how	 ﾠ
dispersed	 ﾠownership	 ﾠis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ corruption	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ strategic	 ﾠ substitutes	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ complements	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firms.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ
implies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠ endogeneity	 ﾠ problems.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ particular,	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ difficult	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ establish	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ causal	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠOLS	 ﾠregressions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
To	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠendogeneity	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimultaneous	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribes	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ estimate	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ two	 ﾠ stage	 ﾠ least	 ﾠ squares	 ﾠ model	 ﾠ
instrumenting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠand	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠidentification	 ﾠstrategy	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
identify	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠor	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠbut	 ﾠnot	 ﾠboth.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠprime	 ﾠ
candidates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinstrumenting	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠare	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassessments	 ﾠ“Quality	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolice”	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠ“Courts	 ﾠare	 ﾠfair	 ﾠand	 ﾠimpartial.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠand	 ﾠcourts	 ﾠhas	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠillegal	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠ
bribe	 ﾠpaying,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠgreat	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠactivities	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠlobbying	 ﾠ
through,	 ﾠe.g.,	 ﾠcampaign	 ﾠdonations	 ﾠor	 ﾠrepresentation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠinstrument	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠ
variable	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanswer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestions	 ﾠto	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠextent	 ﾠ“Businesses	 ﾠare	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠof	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthem”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“Government	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠ
concerns	 ﾠvoiced	 ﾠby	 ﾠbusiness.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠAdvising	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠabout	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regulation	 ﾠand	 ﾠlistening	 ﾠto	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠincorporate	 ﾠ
business	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠinto	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠdecisions.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠinformation	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ access	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ make	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ interests	 ﾠ known	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ regulators	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ politicians	 ﾠ before	 ﾠ
business	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠare	 ﾠimplemented.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠwe	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠto	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluencing	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribing	 ﾠofficials.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpart	 ﾠon	 ﾠsales	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ investment,	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ impact	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ broader	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ firms’	 ﾠ
perception	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠregulative	 ﾠand	 ﾠjudicial	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.  Results:	 ﾠDeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
3.1  Determinants	 ﾠof	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠmain	 ﾠresults	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠpair	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
only	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ dependent	 ﾠ variables	 ﾠ differ:	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying,	 ﾠ
respectively.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpair	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠintroduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠspecification,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthird	 ﾠpairs	 ﾠintroduce	 ﾠsome	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠvariables,	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
fewer	 ﾠobservations,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpairs	 ﾠpresent	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
sector	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠmessage	 ﾠto	 ﾠtake	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthese	 ﾠresults	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠboard,	 ﾠ
factors	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ positively	 ﾠ correlated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ firms’	 ﾠ perceived	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠ negatively	 ﾠ correlated	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ susceptibility	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ and,	 ﾠ
conversely,	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠ













































































































































































































































































































	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠ discussed	 ﾠ above,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ country	 ﾠ indicators	 ﾠ captures	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ
variation	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
variation	 ﾠin	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠside	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠby	 ﾠdiscussing	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
proxies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠand	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠorganization.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Firm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠis	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
base	 ﾠ category	 ﾠ being	 ﾠ medium	 ﾠ sized	 ﾠ firms,	 ﾠ small	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconverse	 ﾠholds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ result	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ surprising	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ influence,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ question	 ﾠ asks	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral,	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlocal,	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSmaller	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠlocally,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfind	 ﾠit	 ﾠhard	 ﾠto	 ﾠwield	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnational	 ﾠstage.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcase	 ﾠand	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠstudies8	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠbig	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
larger	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠwanes	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompetitors	 ﾠ(a	 ﾠresult	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ holds	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ bivariate	 ﾠ correlation),	 ﾠ controlling	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ size,	 ﾠ sector,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
ownership	 ﾠconcentration.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmonopoly	 ﾠor	 ﾠnear-ﾭ‐monopoly	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠyields	 ﾠrents	 ﾠthat	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠbuy	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
eager	 ﾠto	 ﾠprotect	 ﾠthese	 ﾠrents	 ﾠby	 ﾠacquiring	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
fragmented	 ﾠindustry	 ﾠhas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠorganizing	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠaction	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
obtain	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠAn	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
reversed	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ case	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cause	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ fewer	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠSalamon	 ﾠand	 ﾠSiegfried	 ﾠ(1977)	 ﾠnote	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠmay	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠlobbying	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
follow	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠgoals	 ﾠdirectly,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠsize	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠenter	 ﾠlobby	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠleaving	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
free-ﾭ‐riding.	 ﾠCampos	 ﾠand	 ﾠGiovannoni	 ﾠ(2007)	 ﾠfind,	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠat	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠ
size	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠjoin	 ﾠlobby	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠthan	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
competitors	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠan	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠconnected	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠuse	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠto	 ﾠkeep	 ﾠout	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠand	 ﾠestablish	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠdominance.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
When	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠget	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠresult.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
competitors	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ bribes	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ often	 ﾠ (with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ similar	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ
weaker	 ﾠresult	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcorruption;	 ﾠnot	 ﾠreported).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
result	 ﾠ obtained	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ Ades	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ di	 ﾠ Tella	 ﾠ (1999),	 ﾠ but	 ﾠ consistent	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ view	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
monopoly	 ﾠbureaucrats	 ﾠcollecting	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠor	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠmultiple	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
essentially	 ﾠplaying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpermits	 ﾠor	 ﾠfavorable	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠ
each	 ﾠother	 ﾠ(Tullock,	 ﾠ1967;	 ﾠDixit,	 ﾠGrossman	 ﾠand	 ﾠHelpman	 ﾠ1997).	 ﾠ	 ﾠOne	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
data	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠour	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠcompeting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirms’	 ﾠown	 ﾠperception,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠcan	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠless	 ﾠnoisy	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠactual	 ﾠcompetition.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠExporting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
generally	 ﾠ larger	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ controlling	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ size.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Exporting	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ sensitive	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ
changes	 ﾠin	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠand,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally,	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠnations.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHence,	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠengage	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠactivities.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠproxies	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠgovernance	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidentity	 ﾠof	 ﾠowners	 ﾠand	 ﾠownership	 ﾠ
concentration.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ most	 ﾠ obvious	 ﾠ channel	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ structure	 ﾠ
affects	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠowners.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
using	 ﾠan	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠowner	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠobserve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠlower,	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
government	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠowner	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠor	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ
owned	 ﾠ enterprises	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ quite	 ﾠ closely	 ﾠ related	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ executive	 ﾠ branch,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ
provides	 ﾠboth	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠshields	 ﾠthem	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
(Shleifer	 ﾠand	 ﾠVishny,	 ﾠ1993).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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In	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠand	 ﾠthird	 ﾠpairs	 ﾠof	 ﾠregression	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠ
ownership	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm.	 ﾠ	 ﾠForeign	 ﾠowners	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconjectured	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠless	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠthan	 ﾠdomestic	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Controlling	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ exporter	 ﾠ status,	 ﾠ foreign	 ﾠ ownership	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ either	 ﾠ
regression,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ coefficient	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ export	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ
regression	 ﾠshrinks	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠamong	 ﾠ
export	 ﾠstatus,	 ﾠforeign	 ﾠownership	 ﾠand	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠoperations	 ﾠin	 ﾠother	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠranges	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ .23	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ .42,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ their	 ﾠ joint	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ highly	 ﾠ
significant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠ final	 ﾠ governance	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ ownership	 ﾠ concentration	 ﾠ measured	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ owners	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firm.9	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ There	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ weak	 ﾠ positive	 ﾠ correlation	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
number	 ﾠof	 ﾠowners	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFirms	 ﾠowned	 ﾠby	 ﾠone	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠperson	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
entity	 ﾠhave	 ﾠless	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthan	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠdiluted	 ﾠownership.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresult	 ﾠis,	 ﾠ
however,	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ at	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ 10%	 ﾠ level.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Wider	 ﾠ ownership	 ﾠ may	 ﾠ provide	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
broader	 ﾠ constituency	 ﾠ base	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ thus	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ influence.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ At	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ same	 ﾠ time	 ﾠ it	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
noteworthy	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐owned	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprone	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠmore	 ﾠwidely	 ﾠheld	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ third	 ﾠ pairs	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ specifications	 ﾠ finally	 ﾠ consider	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ effect	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ
firm’s	 ﾠ evaluation	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ quality	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ parliament.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ variable	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ significantly	 ﾠ
positively	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠperception	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
negatively	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠits	 ﾠpropensity	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠbribes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠconfirms	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠ invest	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ relationships	 ﾠ —	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ corrupt	 ﾠ practices	 ﾠ —	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠ law	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ rule-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ reliably	 ﾠ undertaken	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ quality	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠor	 ﾠownership	 ﾠconcentration	 ﾠis	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠcrude	 ﾠin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdistinguishes	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠheld	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle	 ﾠowner,	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠto	 ﾠthree	 ﾠowners,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwider	 ﾠownership.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 22	 ﾠ
legislature.	 ﾠ	 ﾠInvesting	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠresources	 ﾠin	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠrules	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠlobbying	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ attractive	 ﾠ when	 ﾠ legislature	 ﾠ has	 ﾠ only	 ﾠ weak	 ﾠ powers	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ there	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ greater	 ﾠ
political	 ﾠinstability.10	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠenvironments,	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠ
(see	 ﾠHarstad	 ﾠand	 ﾠSvensson	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠelaboration	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠthree	 ﾠpairs	 ﾠof	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠare	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠacross	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠand	 ﾠmanufacturing	 ﾠsectors,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconstruction	 ﾠsector	 ﾠare	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠabsent.11	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
sectors	 ﾠdiffer,	 ﾠas	 ﾠreflected	 ﾠin	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠsector-ﾭ‐dummy	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠthree	 ﾠ
sets	 ﾠof	 ﾠregressions,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠaffecting	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
consistent	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ sectors.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ will	 ﾠ become	 ﾠ evident	 ﾠ below,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ
equivalence	 ﾠ across	 ﾠ service	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ manufacturing	 ﾠ sectors	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ extend	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
consequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption.12	 ﾠ
3.2  Influence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribes:	 ﾠComplements	 ﾠor	 ﾠsubstitutes?	 ﾠ
So	 ﾠ far,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ have	 ﾠ treated	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠof	 ﾠeach	 ﾠother,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
used	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ explain	 ﾠ them.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ argue,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ face	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ choice	 ﾠ between	 ﾠ
pursuing	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ bribes	 ﾠ —	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ engaging	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ general	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠ—	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠfavors.	 ﾠ	 ﾠTo	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠ
pair	 ﾠof	 ﾠspecifications	 ﾠshown	 ﾠin	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ2	 ﾠby	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐stage	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsquares.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
shown	 ﾠin	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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10	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠopen	 ﾠto	 ﾠcompetition	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠkeeping	 ﾠ
politicians	 ﾠin	 ﾠcheck;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠPersson	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2003)	 ﾠand	 ﾠAlt	 ﾠand	 ﾠLassen	 ﾠ(2003).	 ﾠ
11	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠhowever	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsector	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠa	 ﾠconclusion	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
viewed	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcare.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
12	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠexperimented	 ﾠwith	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠspecifications;	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠa	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
decomposition	 ﾠyielded	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠinformation,	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠalready	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
The	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠpair	 ﾠof	 ﾠcolumns	 ﾠshows	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠdetermination	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying,	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ pair	 ﾠ shows	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠand	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠcorruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠserving	 ﾠas	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠ
p.16	 ﾠabove)	 ﾠare	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠin	 ﾠquestion:	 ﾠFirms’	 ﾠ
own	 ﾠevaluation	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠabout	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ whether	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ listens	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ business	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ strong	 ﾠ predictors	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
perceptions	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ unlikely	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ
directly.	 ﾠ	 ﾠSimilarly,	 ﾠevaluations	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolice	 ﾠquality	 ﾠand	 ﾠcourt	 ﾠimpartiality	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
predictors	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ corruption.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ confirmed	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ F-ﾭ‐test	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ
excluded	 ﾠinstruments:	 ﾠIn	 ﾠall	 ﾠcases,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtest	 ﾠstatistic	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠwell	 ﾠabove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrule	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
thumb	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ10.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThis	 ﾠprocedure	 ﾠtests	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstrumental	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ
explanatory	 ﾠpower	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠendogenous	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpresence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠ entire	 ﾠ set	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ explanatory	 ﾠ variables.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ stage	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ TSLS-ﾭ‐
procedure	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠall	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠ
equation	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstrumental	 ﾠvariables;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtest	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
instruments	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠF-ﾭ‐test	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠjoint	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstruments	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
zero,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠreject.	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ test	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ over-ﾭ‐identification,	 ﾠ which	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ an	 ﾠ indication	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ
viability	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexclusion	 ﾠrestriction,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstruments,	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvalid,	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠerror	 ﾠterm	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠestimation	 ﾠ
equation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠtest	 ﾠare	 ﾠreported	 ﾠas	 ﾠHansen	 ﾠJ-ﾭ‐statistics:	 ﾠFor	 ﾠall	 ﾠfour	 ﾠ
cases,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠreject	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnull	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠof	 ﾠno	 ﾠover-ﾭ‐identification,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠ our	 ﾠ sets	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ instruments	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ belong	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ estimating	 ﾠ
equations	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTSLS.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠmain	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠin	 ﾠTable	 ﾠ3	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠ
related	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ level	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ its	 ﾠ own,	 ﾠ suggesting	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ bribes,	 ﾠ
understood	 ﾠ here	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ additional	 ﾠ payments,	 ﾠ do	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ buy	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Conversely,	 ﾠ however,	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ higher	 ﾠ levels	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ pay	 ﾠ fewer	 ﾠ
bribes,	 ﾠas	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠare	 ﾠless	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠresort	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ shielded	 ﾠ from	 ﾠ extortive	 ﾠ bureaucrats.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ As	 ﾠ such,	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ
supportive	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠ
paying	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubstitutes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠasymmetry	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
affect	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ statistically	 ﾠ significant	 ﾠ way,	 ﾠ suggests	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ substitutability	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ
asymmetric:	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠcan	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠcredible	 ﾠfavors	 ﾠ
from	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ system	 ﾠ attained	 ﾠ through	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ one-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠ
advantages	 ﾠbought	 ﾠby	 ﾠbribes,	 ﾠweak	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchoice,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ
bribes	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwant	 ﾠto	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠby	 ﾠbureaucrats	 ﾠor	 ﾠpoliticians.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.3  Results:	 ﾠConsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠcorruption	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ section,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ turn	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ consequences	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ influence,	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ
corruption.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠask	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠ
firm	 ﾠoutcomes,	 ﾠcorrecting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠby	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
estimation	 ﾠresiduals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐stage	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsquares	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠreported	 ﾠabove.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
focus	 ﾠon	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWBES	 ﾠsurvey,	 ﾠby	 ﾠlooking	 ﾠ
at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
sales	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠposes	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
limitations,	 ﾠas	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwere	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠasked	 ﾠto	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthey	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠsales	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
investment	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ decrease,	 ﾠ increase	 ﾠ or	 ﾠ remain	 ﾠ unchanged	 ﾠ relative	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ current	 ﾠ
situation.	 ﾠ(+,5/87</:>/7-/<
































































































































































































































































?+;3+,5/<+5/<	 ﾠ 27	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ4	 ﾠwe	 ﾠbegin	 ﾠby	 ﾠpresenting	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon,	 ﾠrespectively,	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠ sales	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ investments	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ defined	 ﾠ above.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ The	 ﾠ first	 ﾠ pair	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ columns	 ﾠ
contains,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcomparison,	 ﾠresults	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠwe	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdirect	 ﾠ
measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying,	 ﾠ while	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ second	 ﾠ pair	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ
regressions	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresidual	 ﾠbased	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTSLS-ﾭ‐procedure,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠcorrected	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠendogeneity.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠpair	 ﾠof	 ﾠresults,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠindistinguishable.13	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠare	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠmore	 ﾠoptimistic	 ﾠ
about	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠsales	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpay	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠlower	 ﾠsales.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlso	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠinterest,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠnoted	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexporting	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠoptimistic	 ﾠboth	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
sales	 ﾠand	 ﾠinvestments,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠcompetitors	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠlower	 ﾠsales,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠownership	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠboth	 ﾠlower	 ﾠsales	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠlower	 ﾠinvestments.	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐hand	 ﾠpart	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠsub-ﾭ‐samples	 ﾠ
divided	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠsize	 ﾠand	 ﾠsector,	 ﾠfocusing	 ﾠon	 ﾠsales	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlack	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
results	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvestment.	 ﾠ	 ﾠHere,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ medium	 ﾠ sized	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ (partly	 ﾠ since	 ﾠ large	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ already	 ﾠ expect	 ﾠ stronger	 ﾠ
sales	 ﾠgrowth,	 ﾠpartly	 ﾠas	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠas	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
fewer	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ sample).	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ We	 ﾠ also	 ﾠ find	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ main	 ﾠ results	 ﾠ seem	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ be	 ﾠ
primarily	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠservice	 ﾠsector.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ5,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
particular,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsee	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠtogether	 ﾠwith	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠownership,	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
positively	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠsales	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsector	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ chance	 ﾠ that	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ firm	 ﾠ receives	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ subsidies.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Both	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠconditioning	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTSLS	 ﾠspecifications	 ﾠ

































































































































































































































































	 ﾠ 29	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠare	 ﾠbinary,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠlinear	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠmodels.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Increasing	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠminimum	 ﾠ(=	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠ(=	 ﾠ6)	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
correlated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠselling	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠsector	 ﾠby	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
13	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠand	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠreceiving	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠ
subsidies	 ﾠby	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ10	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints.	 ﾠ	 ﾠPolitically	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
helpfulness	 ﾠof	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconsiderably	 ﾠhigher,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfind	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
regulations	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠpervasive	 ﾠproblems.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠclaim	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠare	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
relationships;	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcorrelations	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterpretation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
strong	 ﾠ firms	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ better	 ﾠ position	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ politicians	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ regulative	 ﾠ
authorities	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠfirms,	 ﾠtherefore,	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠperception	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠ
4.  Conclusions	 ﾠ
Any	 ﾠtransaction	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbreaking,	 ﾠbending	 ﾠor	 ﾠchanging	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠor	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ
involves	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ demand	 ﾠ side—firms	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ citizens—and	 ﾠ a	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ side—government	 ﾠ
officials,	 ﾠpoliticians,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠparties.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠhas	 ﾠexamined	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
determinants	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ supply	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ rule-ﾭ‐breaking,	 ﾠ in	 ﾠ particular	 ﾠ linking	 ﾠ political,	 ﾠ
economic	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠto	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠof	 ﾠcorruption,	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠ
attention	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠrule-ﾭ‐changing	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
rule-ﾭ‐breaking	 ﾠ by	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ demand-ﾭ‐side	 ﾠ actors.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ In	 ﾠ this	 ﾠ paper,	 ﾠ we	 ﾠ distinguish	 ﾠ rule	 ﾠ
changing,	 ﾠachieved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠterm	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠrule	 ﾠbreaking,	 ﾠ
achieved	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠbribes,	 ﾠpressure	 ﾠand	 ﾠextortion,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠfirm’s	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠ pursuing	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ bribing	 ﾠ government	 ﾠ officials	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
determined	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠorganization	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠparticipates	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠits	 ﾠ
governance	 ﾠstructure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 30	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠ use	 ﾠ firm-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠ survey	 ﾠ evidence	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ construct	 ﾠ measures	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ
influence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠand	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthese	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠare	 ﾠuncorrelated	 ﾠat	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ
level.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠlarger,	 ﾠolder,	 ﾠexporting,	 ﾠgovernment-ﾭ‐owned,	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
widely	 ﾠheld	 ﾠand/or	 ﾠhave	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠcompetitors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence,	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠless	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠand	 ﾠpay	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠless	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ–	 ﾠand	 ﾠvice	 ﾠversa.	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
show	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠbribe	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠare	 ﾠasymmetric	 ﾠsubstitutes:	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
bribe	 ﾠ paying	 ﾠ does	 ﾠ not	 ﾠ affect	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence,	 ﾠ political	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ
hand	 ﾠshields	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠbribes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠsales	 ﾠand	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsubsidies	 ﾠand,	 ﾠin	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠ	 ﾠOur	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠthus,	 ﾠsupports	 ﾠthe	 ﾠview	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
firms	 ﾠuse	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠinfluences	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠlaws	 ﾠand	 ﾠregulations,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠweak	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ
bribes	 ﾠto	 ﾠmitigate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠintervention.	 ﾠ
While	 ﾠfocused	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠside,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠalso,	 ﾠif	 ﾠindirectly,	 ﾠ
makes	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠside	 ﾠargument:	 ﾠFirms	 ﾠthat	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠlegislature	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠquality	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
pay	 ﾠless	 ﾠbribes	 ﾠwhile,	 ﾠconversely,	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlower	 ﾠfaith	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlegislature	 ﾠperceive	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ having	 ﾠ less	 ﾠ influence	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ report	 ﾠ more	 ﾠ bribe	 ﾠ paying.	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ This	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ
consistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠmade	 ﾠby	 ﾠHarstad	 ﾠand	 ﾠSvensson	 ﾠ(2010),	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠseek	 ﾠrule-ﾭ‐breaking	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠ(more)	 ﾠin	 ﾠrule-ﾭ‐changing	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcredibility	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFighting	 ﾠ
corruption	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠchange	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfacilitated	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
trade-ﾭ‐off	 ﾠ on	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ demand	 ﾠ side	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ recognized:	 ﾠ stronger	 ﾠ democratic	 ﾠ institutions	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠlegal	 ﾠavenues	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠand	 ﾠother	 ﾠstakeholders	 ﾠto	 ﾠparticipate	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
rule-ﾭ‐making	 ﾠ process—thus	 ﾠ reduce	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ cost	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ participation—in	 ﾠ addition	 ﾠ to	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 31	 ﾠ
increasing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠbreaking	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrules,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
forms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 32	 ﾠ
5.  Appendix	 ﾠ
Wording	 ﾠof	 ﾠWBES	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠquestions:	 ﾠ
Influence:	 ﾠ“When	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠor	 ﾠdecree	 ﾠis	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠyour	 ﾠbusiness,	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠyour	 ﾠfirm	 ﾠ
typically	 ﾠhave	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnational	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠtry	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcontent	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠlaw,	 ﾠrule,	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠor	 ﾠdecree?”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Answers	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ requested	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ Executive,	 ﾠ Legislature,	 ﾠ Ministry,	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ Regulatory	 ﾠ
Agency	 ﾠand	 ﾠrange	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ=	 ﾠnever	 ﾠinfluential	 ﾠto	 ﾠ6	 ﾠ=	 ﾠvery	 ﾠinfluential.	 ﾠ
Bribe	 ﾠPaying:	 ﾠ“Thinking	 ﾠabout	 ﾠofficials,	 ﾠwould	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠstatement	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
always,	 ﾠusually,	 ﾠfrequently,	 ﾠsometimes,	 ﾠseldom	 ﾠor	 ﾠnever	 ﾠtrue?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ“It	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfirms	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠmy	 ﾠline	 ﾠof	 ﾠbusiness	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠsome	 ﾠirregular	 ﾠ“additional	 ﾠpayments”	 ﾠto	 ﾠget	 ﾠ
things	 ﾠdone.”	 ﾠ”	 ﾠ
Corruption:	 ﾠ“Using	 ﾠthis	 ﾠscale	 ﾠ[No	 ﾠobstacle	 ﾠ…	 ﾠMajor	 ﾠobstacle]	 ﾠcan	 ﾠyou	 ﾠtell	 ﾠme	 ﾠhow	 ﾠ
problematic	 ﾠ are	 ﾠ these	 ﾠ different	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ for	 ﾠ the	 ﾠ operation	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ growth	 ﾠ of	 ﾠ your	 ﾠ
business.”	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Corruption	 ﾠ is	 ﾠ rated	 ﾠ along	 ﾠ with	 ﾠ other	 ﾠ factors	 ﾠ such	 ﾠ as	 ﾠ Financing,	 ﾠ Infrastructure,	 ﾠ
Taxes	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegulation,	 ﾠInflation,	 ﾠStreet	 ﾠcrime/theft/disorder,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠ	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